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1 Based on an inaugural professorial lecture delivered at the University of Sussex on 9 November 1999.
I wish to thank Justin Rosenberg and this journal’s reviewers for their helpful comments.
2 Ken Booth, Statecraft and Security: the Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), p. 353.
3 As it happens, on 9 November 1989 I was checking the proofs of a chapter on the writings of
E.P. Thompson, the historian and peace campaigner (who sadly has since died). I took the
opportunity to comment, in an after-note, on the vindication of his vision which the overthrow of the
Wall represented (‘From Total War to Democratic Peace: Exterminism and Historical Pacifism’, in
Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McClelland (eds.), E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives (Cambridge:
Polity, 1990), p. 250. For E.P. Thompson’s own comment, see ‘Ends and Histories’ in Mary Kaldor
(ed.) Europe from Below (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 7–26. We do not have to substitute a ‘peace
movements’ explanation of the end of the Cold War for more conventional accounts, to acknowledge
the significant roles which the peace and democratic movements played.
The unfinished global revolution: intellectuals
and the new politics of international relations
M A RT I N  S H AW
Abstract. More than a decade after the revolutions of 1989, we can see these as a high point
of a new, worldwide and increasingly global wave of democratic revolution and counter-
revolution. Violent struggles between the political forces unleashed have produced genocidal
wars and stimulated global state formation. These developments present concerned citizens
and students of international relations and politics with new challenges. This article criticizes
two trends in the responses of political intellectuals in the West: the ‘new anarchism’ of some
critical thinkers in the academic discipline of international relations, and ‘yesterday’s
radicalism’ which has led some left-wing critics to revive the defence of sovereignty for
repressive and genocidal non-Western states. The lecture concludes by outlining an alternative
‘new politics’ of international relations.
Ten years ago, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall was breached.1 It is conven-
tional to say that it ‘fell’, although we know that it was pushed.2 A mass movement
of the citizens of Leipzig and other cities had spread to Berlin. Thousands who had
taken refuge in Budapest were granted permission by the governments of Hungary
and East Germany to travel to the West, thus making nonsense of the Wall. These
two kinds of popular movement forced the regime to open the symbolic as well as
the physical door to the West.3
The revolutions of 1989, in Czechoslovakia and Romania as well as Germany,
have been widely understood as marking the end of the Soviet system and of the
Cold War order, and the beginning of a transition in east-central Europe. My con-
tention is that they were more than this. They were the high-point of a worldwide
revolutionary wave of democracy that gathered pace in the late 1980s and has
continued to impact on world politics throughout the last decade. The fate of this
revolution is now in the balance. Where it is going, and what we can do about it, are
the themes of this article.
This wave is not at all confined to Europe. By 1989 it was already evident in the
demands for democratic change in Latin America, where they were beginning to
topple that continent’s military regimes. These demands had already impelled
General Augosto Pinochet Ugarte to seek electoral legitimation for his illegal
regime, thus setting (against his intentions) Chile on the path to democracy and
Pinochet himself on the road to judicial process. The revolutionary wave was already
evident, too, in the movement that overthrew the corrupt regime of Ferdinand
Marcos in the Philippines. Above all, it had been demonstrated earlier that year, in
the May-June events in Beijing—quite as important as the events of the same
months in Paris twenty-one years earlier. This heroic movement set the world’s
largest country on the road to democratic freedoms, which the regime of Jiang
Zemin continues to block.
China reminds us that revolutionary movements bring forward their opposites.
Some older waves of counter-revolution, represented by Pinochet and East
Germany’s Erich Honecker, were coming to an end, but the resilience of others was
demonstrated in Tiananmen Square. And resistance did not only occur in China. In
Romania, protestors were shot by the troops of Nicolae Caucescu, before the
revolution claimed his and his wife’s lives. And little noticed, a new Serbian leader,
Slobodan Milosevic, tore up the autonomy of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo—a
usurpation of legitimate institutions quite as drastic as Pinochet’s and with probably
greater historic consequences.
Looking at the events of 1989 from the vantage of 1999, it is arguable that they
led to more durable changes outside the former Soviet bloc than inside. In central
Europe, it is true, countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic saw
largely (although by no means wholly) positive transformations. In the former Soviet
Union, the results were obviously worse. Mikhail Gorbachev failed to secure
democratic legitimation for his reforms, and the democratic movements of 1989 were
stronger in peripheral republics, like the Baltics, than in Russia itself. Democrats
were strong enough to defeat the manifest counter-revolutionary attempt to over-
throw Gorbachev in 1991, but this was a phyrric victory. Power passed to autocratic
new leaders like Boris Yeltsin who broke up the Soviet Union, creating often-corrupt
new fiefdoms. The depths of the new regime we see in the way that Yeltsin’s
successor, Vladimir Putin, has used war to consolidate his power.
If the revolutionary wave is largely stalled in much of the former Communist
world, it has gathered pace elsewhere. In South Africa in 1989, Nelson Mandela was
still waiting to be freed. The subsequent transition, although far from trouble-free,
has been a remarkable achievement. In Latin America, a continent in which military
dictatorship was endemic is now largely free from it. In Chile—helped (let us note)
rather than hindered by the international action against Pinochet—there are the
beginnings of justice for the victims of the repression of the 1970s and 1980s. Most
remarkable of all has been the gathering transformation in Asia. Although the
Chinese regime hangs on—as do the brutal Burmese generals—the torch lit in the
Philippines has been passed to mass democratic movements, often led by students,
from South Korea to Indonesia.4
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4 Bruce Cumings has argued that the Korean reckoning of 1995 ‘ultimately went beyond anything in
the global transition from authoritarianism that the world has witnessed in the last decade’ and that
‘the contribution of protest to Korean democracy cannot be overstated’: ‘Warfare, Security and
Democracy in East Asia’, in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds.), Democracy, Liberalism and War:
Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2000.) This was written before
the Indonesian movement really developed.
The echoes of democratic revolution can be found even in the more stable,
formally democratic, Western countries. The drastic upheaval of the old party
system in Italy is one manifestation; the removal of Thatcher, the Irish peace process
and the triumph of the centre-left across Western Europe are others. In the West,
democratic movements often take more subtle forms, from the diversion of parlia-
mentary fora at European and regional levels, on the one hand, to social movements
for the democratization of everyday life, on the other. The depth of the latter trend
should not be underestimated: recall the ignominious failure of Margaret Thatcher’s
campaign to restore ‘Victorian values’, in contrast to her success in promoting the
deregulation of markets.
I have referred to these varied, tumultuous events as a single new wave of revolu-
tion—and counter-revolution. What kind of revolutions are these, and how do we
understand their significance? I want to deal with each of these questions in turn.
There have been two previous waves of revolution in the twentieth century. In the
first quarter of the century, peaking at the end of the First World War, there were
proletarian revolutions, with powerful repercussions among the peasantry, mainly in
Europe. These revolutions were mostly crushed, but in Russia they succeeded in
creating the Soviet republic, soon subordinated from within by Stalinist tyranny. In
the second and third quarters, peaking at the end of the Second World War, there
were militarized revolutions with substantial peasant support, which led to the
creation of a larger number of communist states worldwide, notably in China.
Today’s movements are a new stage of the third wave, of democratic revolutions,
which can be traced back at least to the earlier East German uprising, in 1953. In
the second half of the century, this wave challenged the anti-Communist dictator-
ships of southern Europe and the Third World—dictatorships supported by the
Cold War West—as well as the bureaucratic Communist states left by the earlier two
waves.5 The first high point of this wave was the international movement of 1968,
which challenged authoritarianism and arbitrary power in all three segments of the
Cold War world. Students remain a key social group in all of these movements, as
they were when my own generation occupied the colleges at the time of the Vietnam
War.
Towards the global-democratic revolution
It is time to rescue the worldwide democratic revolution from the ‘enormous
condescension’ (to use Thompson’s phrase from another context 6) from which it
suffers in the elite literature of both the liberal centre and the left—who should
know better. According to liberals like Francis Fukuyama, the remarkable trans-
formation—through which a majority of all people now live in states with some sort
of political democracy—represents the inexorable triumph of Western and indeed
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5 In a more fundamental historical sense, of course, the contemporary wave of democratic revolution is
a continuation of the democratic revolution of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Ultimately, neither the proletarian nor the militarized form of the ‘socialist’ revolution succeeded in
surpassing the scope of the democratic revolution in which socialism originated. With their failures,
we have been returned to historic democratic tasks.
6 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1968), p. 3.
American values.7 In this process of ‘democratization’, the lives sacrificed by citizens
of ‘democratizing’ countries, to overthrow regimes that were often supported until
recently by American money and arms, apparently count for little.
The left-wing version of this condescension is just as pernicious. According to
this, democratic upheavals don’t count as revolutions, because they lead to the very
political system advocated by the West, they don’t replace capitalism by socialism (if
anything, the reverse), and they don’t put a revolutionary party into power. To cap it
all, the United States often has the gall to support democratic movements against
the very authoritarian regimes it previously supported, and worse still to support
movements against surviving Communist and post-Communist ruling parties. All of
this makes today’s democratic movements rather suspect to some people on the left,
and certainly discounts them as a central agency of historical change.
Thus for Eric Hobsbawm, ‘the world at the end of the Short Twentieth Century is
in a state of social breakdown rather than revolutionary crisis … .’ 8 For Fred
Halliday, the revolutions of 1989 (and, for that matter, 1956 and 1968) don’t really
count. There is a ‘permanence of unrest’, but the agenda of change which the classic
revolutions inaugurated may now be achieved through reform.9 Perry Anderson is
realistic enough to recognize that democratic movements offer an alternative
perspective on the last decade to that of neo-liberal hegemony: ‘In a longer per-
spective, a more sanguine reading of the time can be made. This, after all, has also
been a period in which the Suharto dictatorship has been overthrown in Indonesia,
clerical tyranny weakened in Iran, a venal oligarchy ousted in South Africa, assorted
generals and their civilian relays brought low in Korea, liberation finally won in East
Timor.’10 But having found the new wave of revolution, Anderson discards it: ‘The
spread of democracy as a substitute for socialism, as hope or claim, is mocked by
the hollowing of democracy in its capitalist homelands, not to speak of its post-
communist adjuncts.’11 Certainly, there are elements of hollowing and manipulation,
but there are also many of renewal and contestation, in the West as well as the non-
West. And the democratic revolution, although it offers no glamorous seizure of
power or expropriation of capital, may be all the better for its more modest modes
of advance. It has not led to totalitarianism and mass death, as did the discredited
waves of both proletarian revolution and guerrilla warfare. One would think that the
enormity of Communism’s record, from Stalin to Mao and Pol Pot, might have held
Anderson back from his quick dismissal of democratic transformation.
For these prominent analysts, schooled in earlier Marxist traditions, this is not
therefore a change in the character of revolution, but a transformation of revolution
into something else. However, there are four reasons for insisting on the revolu-
tionary character of contemporary democratic movements. First, they involve
challenges to national structures of authoritarian state power quite as fundamental
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7 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).
8 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), p. 459, quoted with approval
by Robert Cox, ‘Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World
Order’, Review of International Studies, 25:1, p. 3.
9 Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 334–5. It would be a
caricature to claim that his study is based in any simple way on the assumptions elaborated in the
penultimate paragraph. But his failure to deal seriously with the democratic revolutions of our times
seems to owe something to each of them.
10 Perry Anderson, ‘Renewals’, New Left Review II:1, 2000, p. 15.
11 Ibid., p. 16.
as those made by classic revolutions. Second, they are rooted in widespread popular
agency and deep-rooted aspirations, in a similar way to previous historic upheavals.
Third, they are connected to fundamental changes not only in national structures
but also in international relations, and in the ways these two are connected. And last
but not least, the changes that they produce show every sign of durable impact
on the forms and character of power. Certainly, these are not fundamental
socioeconomic revolutions, but they represent historic political transformations.
Thus democratic transformation is not only revolutionary, but played a crucial
part in breaking down the Cold War system of rival state-blocs.12 Moreover, the
character of the revolutionary wave has been transformed by the new international
conditions in which it now operates. This movement always showed the potential to
spill over into each and every state, invoking universal principles. However, before
1989 its actions were framed within the Cold War division of the world. There was
no way in which democratic movements within the Soviet bloc could receive large-
scale, practical assistance from the West, or in which the United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights could be implemented in the Third World client states
of either bloc. Today this is beginning to change: democratic movements are not
only worldwide in scope and international in their repercussions, but also global in
consciousness.
Since ‘worldwide’, ‘international’ and ‘global’ are often held to mean the same
thing, let me propose ways of distinguishing them. Worldwide relations connect
people around the world: they cross boundaries but do not necessarily negate
them.13 International relations are between national units of state and society.
Global relations, in contrast, are based on the consciousness of living in a common
social sphere. Their first form is the understanding that we share a common natural
environment. The second is that we live in a highly interconnected world.14 The third
is that we share basic common values. Much argument fails to move beyond the first
and especially the second of these meanings. However only with the recognition
of all three elements has globality arrived at its fullest meaning, of human
commonality.15
The roots of globality lie, therefore, in increasingly common world experiences.
Globality is not, as commonly suggested, about how we all consume the same dross
of worldwide commerce, Cokes and Big Macs. It is fundamentally about how
experiences like world wars, the Holocaust and the threat of nuclear annihilation
have made us aware of the common fragility of human existence. It is about how
standards of democratic accountability and human rights are coming to be seen not
as exclusive preserves of rich Westerners, but entitlements of all. Out of these
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12 The Cold War system itself represented a substantial evolution from the inter-imperial state system of
the earlier stages of modernity, under the impact of world war and the revolutionary wave of
1944–45. I deal with these issues in Theory of the Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 3.
13 Worldwide relations are thus an extensive form of what are sometimes called transnational relations.
14 This is of course the most common definition, as in Anthony Giddens’ assertion that ‘globalization
can ... be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.’
The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), p. 64.
15 A fuller discussion of these distinctions will be found in chapter 1 of The Global State. For an earlier,
although in some ways quite different, discussion of globality see Martin Albrow, The Global Age
(Cambridge: Polity, 1996).
concerns has come a more concrete reinforcement of the universalistic tendency of
modern thought, hitherto fundamentally compromised by the national rivalries of
racially based Western empires. The growing sense of common values has informed
global consciousness and institutions ever since the last major turning point in 1945,
but it has been deformed up till now by the rivalries of Cold War blocs. It took the
overthrow of the Cold War order, therefore, to turn this consciousness from an
abstract into a more practical form.
It is in this sense that the democratic revolution is now becoming global. Where
people seek democratic change, they appeal in an increasingly concrete way to
common standards and institutions. Many (if not all) who fight for accountability
and freedoms at a national level now locate these ends within a global context:
universal values and world political and legal institutions. Globality does not make
the national or international redundant: indeed the nation, and its place in inter-
national order, remains one of the universals to which marginalized groups appeal.
However our understandings of the nation and international relations are beginning
to be transformed by seeing them in a global context. International links and
‘cosmopolitan nations’16 can then be seen as building blocks of globality.
Some reject the idea of common global values because their expressions are
mostly Western in origin. However, all world religions contain recognitions of
human commonality. The attempt to assert that there is a ‘clash of civilizations’17,
stronger than those things pulling us together, is not supported by worldwide
evidence. Go to Teheran, first centre of the Islamic revolution: our counterparts in
universities there are trying to connect to global, even Western, politics and culture.
Go to Beijing, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur or Rangoon, and see whether students and
academics will give up ideals of democracy and human rights for the ‘Asian values’
proclaimed by their rulers. Of course, people interpret common values in the
contexts of nationality and religion, and they often have justified suspicions of
Western leaders and world institutions. But none of this negates the strong drive
towards commonality, which means that we can talk of the wave of global-
democratic revolution.
These points are not merely of abstract importance. They have a life-or-death
meaning for many people in non-Western regions. If you are Timorese and have
endured a quarter of a century of oppression, your national aspirations and global
values are not divisible. The people who will tell you about national as opposed to
Western values are those who will burn down your village, kill members of your
family, and disregard your vote. The same is true, of course, for the Kosovo
Albanians or the Iraqi Kurds. For the most oppressed peoples, like the student
campaigners in the capital cities, the democratic revolution is framed within a global
commonality of values.18
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16 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), pp. 130–2: this term makes partial sense,
at least, of trends in places as far apart as South Africa and Britain, although both trend and concept
are far from uncontested.
17 This increasingly notorious term is, of course, from Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
18 Of course, many leaders of secessionist movements are opportunist in their espousal of democracy;
left to their own devices they often introduce new forms of national and other oppression.
Genocidal war and global state-building
How this global-democratic revolution relates to relations between states is also
important, in theory and practice. Traditionally, revolution has been understood as a
question of political sociology, relations between states as the subject of inter-
national relations. Of course people have recognized how the two affect each other:
revolutions have always had repercussions for relations between states, and inter-
national relations, especially wars, are part of the conditions for revolution.19
Today, because of structural changes that are partly products of the new
democratic movements, the basic compartmentalization underlying these analyses no
longer works in the old way. Global-democratic revolution is not just about the form
of government within states, but about the shape of world order. Wars, traditionally
thought about as being mainly between centres of state power, are now mostly
between states and peoples. And yet they are not simply ‘civil wars’, in the old sense
of conflicts within a single state. What Mary Kaldor has called ‘new wars’ are about
the shape of civil society as well as the state.20 They mobilize cross-border alliances
of ethnic nationalists, on the one hand, and of civic nationalists with global
humanitarians, on the other.
In reality, most wars going on at the turn of the early twenty-first century (and
some are not so new) are wars of the anti-democratic, anti-globalist counter-
revolution. War is the tool of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, in
quasi-imperial states like Serbia and Iraq, Indonesia, Turkey and Sudan, and indeed,
Russia and China, threatened by democratic movements—and particular by
secessionist demands from oppressed minorities which inevitably accompany
democratization.21 I contend that in the hands of this kind of state machine, war is
almost invariably genocidal to some degree. But many question whether atrocities
such as those of the Serbian regime in Kosovo amount to ‘genocide’.
Clearly our understanding of genocide needs to be deepened.22 The international
convention refers to the deliberate destruction of a national, racial, ethnic or
religious group ‘in whole or in part’.23 There are two obvious problems in taking this
international legal definition as the basis for a full understanding. The first is that it
accords a special ontological status to particular kinds of group, so that their
destruction is seen as particularly heinous, while that of other kinds of group is not.
In any case, episodes of mass slaughter are rarely confined to particular groups of
any kind. Genocidal regimes almost invariably target a variety of groups more or
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19 See the classic modern study of these issues, in the context of the French, Russian and Chinese
revolutions: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979); also Halliday, Revolution.
20 Mary Kaldor, Old and New Wars: Organized Warfare in the Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1999).
21 Clearly authoritarian, quasi-imperial states come in many shapes and sizes, and I do not intend to
suggest a simple equivalence between the states listed here. There are (highly variable) reform
processes, as well as repression, in some of these states. Nevertheless there are important
commonalities in their responses to democratic movements and, especially, movements of national
minorities. These lead to a growing contrast between major non-Western centres of state power and
the democratized West, where secessionist movements are increasingly managed within processes of
internationalization. I develop this contrast below, and more fully in ch. 7 of The Global State.
22 The following discussion is based on preliminary work for a forthcoming book on war and genocide:
see, for example, ‘On slaughter’, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/slaughter.htm.
23 For the full definition see Roy Guttman and David Rieff (eds.), Crimes of War (New York: Norton,
1999), p. 142.
less simultaneously (in the case of the Nazis these included communists, the
mentally handicapped, Poles and other Slavs, and Roma, as well as Jews). They link
social targets to the soldiers and civilians of state enemies whom they kill in more
conventional war. They kill people because of their gender (for example, men as
potential combatants, women because of the significance of sexual humiliation), age
(for example, the young because they are productive, the old because they are
‘useless’ ) and social status (for example, the educated and officials as potential
leaders, peasants as supporters of resistance). The execution (literally) of centrally
defined policies depends, additionally, on the instant decisions of killers ‘on the
ground’. There is a ‘fog’ of genocide as much as of war. In short, from the point of
view of many victims (a not unimportant consideration for social theory), genocidal
killing is deeply arbitrary and indiscriminate. It follows that we should be careful not
to give legal or sociological standing to the pseudo-rationalities of murderous
practice.
There is another kind of problem, signified by the argument, fudged in the legal
definition, over the extent of destruction that qualifies as ‘genocide’. Here the
Holocaust model has widely lodged a maximalist concept of clinical extermination
as a standard that, almost by definition, no other case can meet. This makes it
easy for all kinds of people to deny as ‘genocide’ cases that they find politically
inconvenient. However it is clear that episodes of mass killing are always deeply
embedded in the social and political relations of which they are outcomes. It makes
little sense to separate large-scale killing in any absolute sense from the escalations of
social emnity, political exclusion, violence and smaller-scale killing which usually
precede it. In this sense we have to recognize organized slaughter as a set of
processes that includes more limited killing episodes (sometimes called genocidal
massacres), mass expulsions, rape, and terror of many kinds. The overall meaning of
this is the attempt to assert the absolute power of the génocidaires over that of the
target social groups. This is war, not so much with other means as with other
enemies: a section or sections of civilian society. Usually it takes place in the context
of more recognizable war between political centres.
These problems could lead us to question the very category of genocide. If,
however, we attempt to give it a rational meaning, this must include both the
intention of destroying, through processes that involve organized mass killing, the
social power of some kind of human group, together with results that include
relatively indiscriminate terror and mass slaughter. To say, then, that new wars are
genocidal is not to equate them in any simple way with the Holocaust. However,
what the Nazis did when they defined international Jewry and other groups as
enemies alongside more conventional state enemies24 has become the normal model
in new wars, even though the ideology, scale, means and extents of killing all differ
from the major precedent.
Thus the wars of Saddam Hussein have targeted Kurds, Shia and Marsh Arabs as
much as Iran, Kuwait and the West. The wars of Slobodan Milosevic have been
fought against Croat, Bosnian Muslim and Albanian civilians—and plural
communities like Sarajevo—as much as the Croatian and Bosnian states, the Kosovo
Liberation Army and NATO. The interahamwe and their political masters declared
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war on the Tutsi people as well as the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The means of war
have included burning, robbery, torture, incarceration in camps and rape as well as
execution and massacre. War has become increasingly genocidal in the sense I have
defined. This is true although some of these states have not intended complete
extermination of their enemy populations, and even those that have intended some-
thing approximating to this have not achieved it—any more, of course, than the
Nazis themselves achieved the complete destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust.
It is true that even the Nazis did not invent these tactics. The point is not that
today’s (or even yesterday’s) wars are crueller than those of earlier periods, but that
the deliberate destruction of civilian populations has become more than a means of
prosecuting interstate war, as it was in the case of Allied strategic bombing in the
Second World War.25 Expulsion and mass killing of civilians is often the main point
of war for today’s authoritarian states, as it was for the Nazis, and indeed for some
colonizing wars against indigenous peoples.26 Moreover, since the Holocaust we have
a global standard by which to judge these policies. Genocide may have existed before
it was named; the naming (however much it raises as well as solves difficult questions
of understanding) means that we can now begin to recognize and deal with the
challenge to our humanity that slaughter presents.
The fact that genocide is defined by an international convention emphasizes that
globality is about common values, not merely in an abstract sense, but in the
practical sense of norms, laws and institutions. Looked at sociologically, the inter-
national regulation and punishment of war and genocide amount to an instance in
the processes of state formation on a global scale. One of Marx’s most interesting
ideas was that all previous revolutions had always ‘perfected this [state] machine
instead of smashing it.’ 27 He thought that the proletarian revolution would be the
exception, but historical experience has hardly been kind to this idea. It seems that
the tendency of revolutions to encourage the growth of the state may be a general
law. I want to examine its significance for the global-democratic revolution.
Several new state forms have resulted from recent struggles between democratic
movements and genocidal repression. One is the expansion of international law and
legal institutions, especially the tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the
proposed new International Criminal Court. A second is ‘humanitarian inter-
vention’, which covers a broad range of military and other action by coalitions of
states and international organizations, invoking United Nations authority. Its ends
range from the provision of humanitarian supplies to threatened communities to the
imposition of political settlements in zones of conflict. A third is the idea of the
‘international community’ of states, an ideological representation in which states are
seen as combining for common world interests and in defence of common principles.
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26 See Michael Mann, ‘Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution from Historical Sociology’
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27 Karl Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, quoted by Ralph Miliband, ‘Marx and the State’, in
Miliband and John Saville (eds.), The Socialist Register 1965 (London: Merlin, 1965), p. 290.
These are all developments of a global layer of state power.28 Like the rest of this
layer, they are constituted internationally, that is, through relations between national
state-entities. Global law and legal institutions take the form of international law;
global intervention of international intervention; global community of international
community. It is apparent, moreover (from the pre-eminent role of Western states) that
all three depend on processes of state development in the West itself. Indeed, while the
extension of the global layer is supported by many smaller non-Western states, major
centres like Russia, China and India are at best reluctant partners. With the collapse of
the Soviet bloc, there is however no serious counter-weight to the West, and most
developments of global institutions depend on Western resources and political will.
The West—in the political sense which includes Japan as well as north America,
western Europe and Australasia29—comprises of course a small and declining
proportion of the world’s population. But its economies account for most wealth
and its states for most worldwide state expenditure, military and civilian. Its inter-
nationalized structures, from NATO and other military alliances to the IMF, OECD,
WTO and Group of Seven, and its regional organization, especially the European
Union, give it a worldwide structure of power, to which other state centres can only
give grudging assent. Its political model, parliamentary democracy, has finally
become convincingly institutionalized across almost all member-states of Western
institutions, and the West now promotes rather than opposes its adoption elsewhere.
The worldwide democratic revolution has arrived, however, uninvited by Western
statesmen and often a cause of some embarrassment to them. The first post-Cold
War generation, George Bush, John Major and François Mitterand, wielded the
rhetoric of the ‘New World Order’ but had few real plans for global reform. When
they identified Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait as a military challenge, it was largely for old-
fashioned strategic reasons. Their aims were international, to restore Kuwait’s
sovereignty, not global, to institute democracy or protect human rights. ‘I don’t
recall asking the Kurds to mount this particular insurrection’ proclaimed Major
petulantly as the trails of refugees poured across the mountainsides, demanding
protection and spoiling the victory celebrations.30 But before long, these same
leaders were eating their words and forging the intervention in Kurdistan—the chief
precedent for today’s global power-projection.31 Major proclaimed ‘safe havens’ as
his very own contribution.32
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The second generation of Western leaders is not much better. In opposition, Bill
Clinton took a strong stand against ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia; but he too saw
domestic prosperity as the key to success—‘It’s the economy, stupid’, as one of his
advisers famously opined. Handed the poisoned chalice of Somalia, the new
administration drew negative conclusions from the humiliation of American soldiers
there. Many wrote off international intervention worldwide at that point. They were
wrong. Before long, similar exposures of Western weakness in Bosnia worked the
opposite way, pulling the US towards Dayton and a permanent NATO role in the
Balkans. As we all know, 1999 saw dramatic further examples of a united West
prepared to use military power, both to protect threatened civilian populations and
to create new political realities, in Kosovo and Timor—although in both cases only
after terrible suffering was inflicted.
However, the ambivalence over the general scope and means of Western policy
remains, and can be regarded as, structural. On the one hand, the West’s de facto
world dominance and unrivalled physical and authoritative resources mean that the
forces of global-democratic change inevitably seek its support and protection. The
weaker the local democratic movement, the more it must depend on worldwide
support. Western civil-society organizations may be more reliable allies, but they too
depend on the frameworks and finance offered by state institutions, national and
international.33
On the other hand, the West’s commitments to global-democratic change are
uncertain. In the United States, especially, there is deep-seated opposition to the
extension of global institutions, manifested in the scandalous failure to meet its UN
dues and the alliance with China to limit the powers of the International Criminal
Court. In Europe, while support for international bodies is stronger, there is an
inward-looking focus on developing the Union itself. Everywhere, support for global
political change is mediated by national electoral politics, which can always work
both ways.34
Two other structural problems, partly inherited from the Cold War, reinforce the
ambivalent character of Western power in world politics. First, although dominant,
the West has serious difficulties in projecting even non-military power directly into
the territories of the principal non-Western states. Containing smaller powers like
Iraq, Serbia and North Korea, and even managing situations like Somalia and Sierra
Leone, have created enormous costs and intractable problems. There is no real
question of the West’s trying to police Russia or China in the same way. Whatever
happens in Kosovo or Timor, there will be little ‘humanitarian intervention’ in
Chechnya or Tibet. This should not prevent the West from using its political and
economic levers in these situations. But the West has no alternative but partial
coexistence with the main authoritarian states.
This inevitably seems to encourage compromises with arbitrary and corrupt rule.
Western leaders slip all too easily into complicity with even the worst local regimes,
as Dayton showed. Patterns of collaboration are often inherited from Cold War
alliances or compounded by commercial interests. Hence the British state supports
The unfinished global revolution 637
33 See my discussion in Civil Society and Media, pp. 30–70 and 175–8.
34 For example, television coverage can both spur intervention, by highlighting atrocities, and constrain
it, by threatening to show the ‘body bags’ of Western soldiers. See my discussion in Civil Society and
Media, especially pp. 178–81.
Timorese independence and licences arms sales to Indonesia, supports democratic
change in China and cosies up to Jiang Zemin—all at the same time. The ‘ethical
dimension’ to foreign policy is just that—one dimension alongside others, which
include the strategic, the commercial, and so on. Michael Mann has explained this
theoretically as the ‘polymorphous crystallization’ of state power: different crystal-
lizations dominate different state institutions, so that often ‘the left hand has not
known what the right hand is doing’.35
Second, the West’s institutions, forces and modus operandi are still largely
inherited from the Cold War. When the West finally abandoned its search for com-
promise with Milosevic, it fell back on a strategy of aerial bombardment inherited
from the Second World War via Vietnam and Iraq. The so-called ‘revolution in
military affairs’ has certainly made bombing less indiscriminate than it was, but even
NATO admitted this was a blunt instrument that killed some innocents even as it
saved others. Above all, of course, it saved Western soldiers’ lives while risking Serb
and Albanian civilians. Here Cold War capability coincided with the electoral
imperative to keep body bags off our screens.
If we look at these contradictions in historical perspective, we are in the midst of
a great world transformation. State power is not being undermined in any simple
general sense, as those who are over-impressed with the advances of world markets
and information technology suggest. State power is transforming—becoming
globalized rather than weakened.36 A post-imperial, democratic, internationalized
Western state can largely mobilize the growing global layer of state. The axis
between these two forms the core of a global structure of state power.37
This global-Western state confronts secondary powers with quasi-imperial, semi-
authoritarian structures. While powerful in historical terms, the main non-Western
states lag greatly behind the West in resources and authority. These states face a
democratic momentum sufficiently strong for all but the most repressive regimes to
trim. China’s rulers claimed on their fiftieth anniversary that they represent ‘democ-
racy’, and Pakistan’s military regime makes the same boast. More significantly, Boris
Yeltsin’s near-monarchical rule could not buck elections; even Milosevic had to
master the art of electoral manipulation, and in the end it was his undoing.
Democracy has even been incorporated into the grammar of genocide: homo-
genous electorates are a prime aim of ‘ethnic cleansing’.38 This is the backhanded
compliment that the ugliest form of political practice pays to an ideal that is
sweeping much before it. I suspect that in a few decades’ time we will look back on
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today’s world and find today’s remaining authoritarianisms as anachronistic as we
already find the totalitarianisms of Hitler, Stalin and Mao. Not only could demo-
cratic institutions become general; the infrastructure of a global state, resulting from
today’s layer of global institutions and the Western state, may be greatly enhanced.39
The big question is whether we can get from here to there without many more of
the wars which have multiplied in recent years—indeed without wars between big
nuclear centres of state power. So far the trends towards global order, while striking,
have definite limits. The demands of world commerce and communication, as well as
democratic movements, partly push in this direction,40 but there are powerful
opposing interests. We may face decades of conflict between society and states, and
if we are even more unfortunate, between state centres too. Contrary to the simpler
versions of democratic peace theory,41 the spread of democracy within national
borders does not automatically bring peace. Democratizing processes can actually be
very dangerous to those involved—as we have seen in Timor and elsewhere. Only
stable national democratic entities within a consolidated global framework are likely
to secure a peaceful world.
Limits of the new anarchism42 in international relations
I turn now to the responsibilities of scholars and students of international relations
and politics towards these issues. We cannot be outside the political field of global-
democratic transformation. Indeed across the world, many of our colleagues are in
the forefront of movements for change, while all too often, people like us are prime
targets of authoritarian power and even genocide. I want therefore to look at the
relevance of two kinds of intellectual response to current change. First I discuss
some recent theoretical ideas in international relations; second, I consider trends in
the wider intellectual and political debate.
It is unfortunate that the gap between the two areas of thought is wide. Despite
new Labour’s intellectual gurus, in Britain academia and public debate remain
mostly worlds apart.43 William Wallace has written recently of his frustration with
this situation; I sympathize with his case for political relevance, but I cannot agree
with his diagnosis or solutions for the discipline.44 For even if, as Michael Nicholson
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‘Discussion: A Reply to Wallace’, Review of International Studies, 23 (1997), pp. 371–7.
has argued, some of the claims of so-called ‘post-positivism’ 45 in international
relations are ‘myths’46, the critical theoreticization of international relations was a
necessary development. Without it, is difficult to see how the field would have
escaped from the constraints of the taken-for-granted ‘realism’ which privileged the
‘national interest’ centred on the truly mythical ‘unitary’ nation-state—or its dog-
matic restatement as structural realism.47
However the chief use of new political theory in international relations has been
to challenge old ideas—like the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the
state48—rather than to provide substantial new analyses. To my mind historical
sociologists like Mann have given us far more usable frameworks for analysing states
within power networks which cross the ‘domestic-foreign frontier’ 49—but they too
have sometimes been slow to recognize the transformation of world politics.50
‘Philosophical’ critiques will remain salutary so long as we fail to confront the
revolutionary transformations of our times.
The full critique that we need is suggested by Marx’s most famous aphorism.51 To
paraphrase: the international relationists have only discussed how to explain and
understand the world—the point is to change it.52 New realities call not only for new
understanding, but also for new political responses, framed historically as well as
philosophically. In this sense, ‘post-Westphalian’ political philosophy, premised on
the earlier historical reality of a ‘Westphalian’ state, remains a problematic starting-
point, sharing too many of the founding assumptions of the dominant traditions.
International relationists have been, for the most part, international anarchists.
They have mostly believed not only that the world is, but also that it must necessarily
remain divided between sovereign political communities. Whatever their other
differences, they have tended to agree that world order can only be constructed on
this basis.53 Traditionally, so-called realists saw order as a result of the balance of
power in the international system, often centred on the hegemony of a single power
such as the United States after 1945. The so-called English School, on the other
hand—including my Sussex predecessor, Martin Wight—argued that there must be
some sort of shared civilizational understanding (or ‘international society’).54
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The most fundamental problem with both claims is this. The idea that we have an
international system characterized by order jars badly with our understanding of
modern history. The extreme violence routinely inflicted by states—through their
international relations—on society worldwide is sufficient to bring this notion into
question. It is more plausible to see international anarchy as problem than as
solution. Recently, international scholarship has increasingly prioritized individual
human rights against the claims of states, and has argued for cosmopolitan frame-
works for political community.55 In these contexts, as Ken Booth has argued, states
should be seen more as the source of ‘human wrongs’ than of order.56
However the answers to this problem are often sought in bypassing the state, in a
position which echoes classical anarchism rather than its international realist
mutation. For Booth, for example, in his own inaugural lecture (at Aberystwyth in
1991), ‘No central government deserves much trust. … Even decent governments are
not necessarily mindful of the interests and diversity of all their citizens’. World
government is dismissed as an almost totalitarian nightmare: ‘The idea of
centralising all power on a world scale is a fearful prospect, and not likely to work’.
Security will be created, he proposes, through ‘an anarchical, global “community of
communities”’, but the mechanisms for this remain obscure.57
Hence anarchism proves to be even more deep-rooted in international relations
than first appears. Indeed a similar trend is evident in the Gramscian literature on
social movements and civil society. Thus Robert Cox argues for a ‘two track’
strategy:
First, continued participation in electoral politics and industrial action as a means of
defensive resistance against the further onslaught of globalization; and secondly, but
ultimately more importantly, pursuit of the primary goal of resurrecting a spirit of
association in civil society together with a continuing effort by organic intellectuals of social
forces to think through and act towards an alternative social order at local, regional and
global levels.58
The mistakes in this passage are also twofold. First, the myth of globalization as
threat or onslaught—which can only be resisted—is combined with the myth of the
weakening of the state.59 Second, hopes for ‘an alternative social order’ are vested in
the ‘resurrection’ of civil society, but Cox himself identifies a fundamental difficulty
with this scenario, ‘the still small development of civil society’.60 The expansion of
civil society is indeed crucial to the long-term consolidation of a worldwide demo-
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in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge:
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57 Ken Booth, ‘Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice’, International Affairs,
67:3 (1991), p. 540.
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59 For critiques, see Paul Q. Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge:
Polity, 1996) and Held et al., Global Transformations.
60 Cox, ‘Civil Society’, p. 13.
cratic order. But civil society is not only too weak to take the full weight of global
transformation, it is also still too national in form.61 Moreover, it is theoretically and
practically inconceivable that we can advance emancipation without simultaneously
transforming state power.62
While Booth explicitly rejects world government, Cox largely avoids the role of
internationalized state organizations. He sees nation-states as playing ‘the role of
agencies of the global economy’63 and seems incapable either of understanding the
global transformations of state power, or envisaging a constructive role for them.
Critical international theorists have dug themselves into a hole over this issue. In
committing themselves to ‘globalization from below’, as Richard Falk64 calls it, they
are simply missing political battles that matter in today’s world. Falk is certainly
moving towards a new position when he writes:
An immediate goal of those disparate social forces that constitute globalization-from-below is
to reinstrumentalize the state to the extent that it redefines its role as mediating between the
logic of capital and the priorities of its peoples, including their short-term and longer-term
goals.65
But this tortuous language is hardly necessary. People’s movements have been on the
streets throughout the last decade, trying to make both national and international
state organizations responsive and accountable. The real question is: How could this
question ever have been marginalized in any serious radical project?
It sometimes seems that critical international theorists have left the state aside.66
Critics evacuate the harsher edges of world politics for the soft ‘non-realist’ territory
of political economy, gender and civil society. No such refuge is possible, however.
Economic and gender inequalities will not be solved so long as the repressive state is
untamed. The new international relations will have to formulate its response to the
continuing role of organized violence in the world order.
A loose ‘governance without government’67 is too easily supported. While Booth
is obviously right that all government is imperfect, the differences between ‘relatively
decent’ and tyrannical government, both nationally and globally, are absolutely
critical. Without addressing the nature of contemporary global state networks, and a
serious discussion of the ways in which they can be developed into an adequate
global authority framework sustained by and sustaining local democracies, we have
hardly begun to fashion a new agenda.
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‘Yesterday’s visions’ and the old radicalism
World events repeatedly thrust these issues into our faces, but in the wider public
debate too, many—lacking an understanding of the new situation—fall back on old
ways of thought. The idea of absolute state sovereignty is resurrected by many who
should know better, to defend the autonomy of repressive, even genocidal states.
Louise Arbour, retiring Chief Prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, provided a terse comment on this move. ‘Since the
creation of this Tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal, the Rome statute’, she says, ‘… there
is now a much more ambitious agenda: the one of peace with justice, where no one
can hijack the concept of state sovereignty and use it to guarantee his own impunity.
These are yesterday’s visions of a peaceful world.’68
That these are indeed ‘yesterday’s visions’ is clear from the selective way in which
they are used. It is a curious anti-imperialism that attacks the so-called ‘imperialism
of human rights’ 69 but provides the defence of sovereignty to the imperialism of
genocidal oppression.70 Something is wrong with the radical tradition, when as
distinguished a representative as Edward Said could write of the Kosovo war that
what he found ‘most distressing’ was the ‘destruction from the air’ wrought by
American power71—not the genocidal massacres by Serbian forces that prompted
NATO’s (admittedly problematic) response.
Said has reminded us recently of what Thompson called the ‘Natopolitan’ world,
in which many intellectuals were indirectly on the payroll of the CIA.72 What he did
not acknowledge was its Stalinist counterpart, in which intellectuals sold their souls
to the KGB and the Stasi. And there was an anti-Cold War world, in which those
who refused the choice of NATO and the Warsaw Pact elaborated their ideas.
Although those of us in this intellectual third world turned down the lucre of the
blocs, this did not guarantee lasting validity to our ideas.
In the new global era, many characteristic assumptions of the old anti-Cold War
left appear increasingly as prejudices. A whole generation has not let go of a
mindset, four elements of which are problematic in the new situation. Most funda-
mental is a residual Third Worldist ideology. According to this, Western, especially
American, imperialism is the touchstone for all world politics. Said’s anachronistic
conclusion about Kosovo was to ask: ‘When will the smaller, lesser, weaker peoples
realize that this America is to be resisted at all costs, not pandered to or given in to
naively?’73 There are strong criticisms to be made of American and NATO policies
in Kosovo. However a systematic blindness lies behind the continuing belief that
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America is the principal problem, coupled with the failure to recognize the need for
international action against genocide.74
From this viewpoint, non-Western states are potential sites of resistance,
organizers of ‘underdeveloped political economies’75 which can contest the domi-
nant form. While sovereignty in general may be regarded as a political form of
capitalist social relations76, the sovereignty of non-Western states must be defended
from Western power. Yet to support Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, or Chinese
over Tibet, gives sustenance to forms of colonial domination deeply mired in blood.
Critics find themselves in an inversion of the double standard of which they accuse
NATO: if it is right to support Timorese self-determination against Indonesian
claims to sovereignty, how can the same right be denied to the Kosovans or
Tibetans?77
Second, there are echoes of the intellectual left’s ambiguous attitudes to
Communism itself. A residual affinity for post-Communist states makes NATO’s
attack on rump Yugoslavia particularly shocking.78 Left-wing critics were especially
offended by NATO’s sidelining of Russia, but ignored how the unstable and self-
serving character of the Yeltsin government’s positions made it a unreliable part-
ner.79 Indeed Russia’s imperial role in the former Soviet area, reflected in a
reluctance to support international justice, makes it a problematic player, however
necessary is its participation in European and world security systems.
Third, there is a rather pious attitude to the United Nations, seen as requiring a
consensus of the world’s major states to act as a legitimate world centre. Thus left-
wing critics were often disingenuous in their criticisms of NATO’s failure to seek
UN authorization—ignoring Russian and Chinese determination to veto any action
against Yugoslavia, in the light of their own imperial repression in Chechnya, Tibet,
and so on. They also ignored, of course, the anachronistic character of the Security
Council veto itself.
Finally, there is the generalized pacifism of anti-Cold War politics. To my mind,
this is the element of this position with by far the greatest continuing salience. The
horror at aerial bombardment has deep roots in modern history—for many older
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people based on childhood experience,80 for others resonating from the nuclear
threat. Objections to the use of airpower are compounded by complaints about ‘the
fastidiousness articulated about the loss of American lives’, which Said was not
alone in finding ‘positively revolting’.81
Nevertheless, this concern too often remains at the level of abstract criticism, and
fails to specify the kinds of alternative power-projection that might address the dire
situations of people like the Kosovans or Timorese. Indeed critics of bombing also
often reject not only other forms of military power, but international political and
legal interventions, as mere Western power-projection.82 A simple pacifism was only
partially viable during the Cold War (even then there were reasonable demands for
‘alternative defence policies’ ). It does little to address the realities of global politics,
in which a relatively modest use of military power may protect a threatened civilian
population.
Underlying these specific positions, of course, is the continuing socialist critique
of a capitalist world. Democratization is also often seen as a new form of Western
or American power.83 Ironically, this functionalist approach attributes too much
power to the West, and too little to the movements that are forging global-
democratic change. It is a very limited sort of socialist understanding that fails to
grasp the potential of democracy to open up social reform. This socialism has not
learnt the fundamental lesson of its twentieth-century failures: no genuine social
change is possible without political democracy and individual freedom.
The new politics of international relations
The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the
anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of
the academic discipline. We need to recognize three fundamental truths. First, in the
twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-
Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous
academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these
movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second,
the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely
internal to states no longer carries conviction—despite the lingering nostalgia for it
on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global prin-
ciples can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of
hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will become a powerful force in
the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions
are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major
centre of state power, the increasingly internationalized Western conglomerate. The
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success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is
consolidated in each national context—but second, on how thoroughly it is
embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is
the West.
From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First,
democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organizations and civil
society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilize local states, rendering them
open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of
power. Second, democratizing local states is not a separate task from integrating
them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local
centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.84
Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional
frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way: the
proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.)
Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN,
neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we
need to tame them too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more
accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the
kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held.85 It will also require us
to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic
scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate problem: social and
economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal
power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth,
if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratize it and make its
institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its
strategic debates. It matters to develop international political interventions, legal
institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way
through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist
structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid.86
As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our
feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic
drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well
as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global
revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of
both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this
prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western and
other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.87 What I
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have outlined is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolu-
tion splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new genocidal wars—perhaps
even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the
theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and
politics, are intertwined.
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